Background: Dementia care at home often involves decisions in which the caregiver must weigh safety concerns with respect for autonomy. These dilemmas can lead to situations where caregivers provide care against the will of persons living with dementia, referred to as involuntary treatment. To prevent this, insight is needed into how family caregivers of persons living with dementia deal with care situations that can lead to involuntary treatment. Objective: To identify and describe family caregivers’ experiences regarding care decisions for situations (...) that can lead to involuntary treatment use in persons living with dementia at home. Research design: A qualitative descriptive interview design. Data were analysed using the Qualitative Analysis Guide of Leuven. Participants and research context: A total of 10 family caregivers providing care for 13 persons living with dementia participated in in-depth semi-structured interviews. Participants were recruited by registered nurses via purposive sampling. Ethical consideration: The study protocol was approved by the Ethics Committee of the University Hospitals Leuven and the Medical Ethical Test Committee Zuyderland. Findings: Family caregivers experience the decision-making process concerning care dilemmas that can lead to involuntary treatment as complicated, stressful and exhausting. Although they consider safety and autonomy as important values, they struggle with finding the right balance between them. Due to the progressive and unpredictable nature of dementia, they are constantly seeking solutions while they adapt to new situations. Family caregivers feel responsible and experience social pressure for the safety of persons living with dementia. They may be blamed if something adverse happens to the persons living with dementia, which increases an already stressful situation. Their experience is influenced by characteristics of the care triad (persons living with dementia, professional and family caregivers) such as practical and emotional support, knowledge, and previous experiences. Discussion and conclusion: To prevent involuntary treatment, professionals need to proactively inform family caregivers, and they need to support each other in dealing with complex care situations. (shrink)

Technology is evolving at a rate faster than human evolution, especially human moral evolution. There are those who claim that we must morally bioenhance the human due to existential threats (such as climate change and the looming possibility of cognitive enhancement) and due to the fact that the human animal has a weak moral will. To address these existential threats, we must design human morality into human beings technologically. By moral bioenhancement, these authors mean that we must intervene technologically in (...) the biology of the human animal in order to get it to behave morally to address these existential threats. I will bring the idea of moral bioenhancement into conversation with two philosophers of technology. Bernard Stiegler has argued that technology and culture, and thus technology and human beings, have always evolved hand in hand. Peter-Paul Verbeek notes that we have always designed morality into technology, and thus he sees technology as mediating human morality. When we offload human intentionality onto technology, Verbeek argues, technological objects and systems participate in shaping the moral subjectivity of the human actor. I will show that modern technological bioenhancement obliterates human being. Whereas in the past, human culture was handed from generation to generation through the mediation of technology, in the modern era, the human becomes the raw material upon which a technological will (imperative) rides. (shrink)

Since the emergence of the innovative field of artificial intelligence in the 1960s, the late Hubert Dreyfus insisted on the ontological distinction between man and machine, human and artificial intelligence. In the different editions of his classic and influential book What computers can’t do, he posits that an algorithmic machine can never fully simulate the complex functioning of the human mind—not now, nor in the future. Dreyfus’ categorical distinctions between man and machine are still relevant today, but their relation has (...) become more complex in our increasingly data-driven society. We, humans, are continuously immersed within a technological universe, while at the same time ubiquitous computing, in the words of computer scientist Mark Weiser, “forces computers to live out here in the world with people” The cell phone reader. Peter Lang Publishing, New York, 2006, p 20). Dreyfus’ ideas are therefore challenged by thinkers such as Weiser, Kevin Kelly, Bruno Latour, Philip Agre, and Peter Paul Verbeek, who all argue that humans are much more intrinsically linked to machines than the original dichotomy suggests—they have evolved in concert. Through a discussion of the classical concepts of individuum and ‘authenticity’ within Western civilization, this paper argues that within the ever-expanding data-sphere of the twenty-first century, a new concept of man as ‘aggregate of data’ has emerged, which further erodes and undermines the categorical distinction between man and machine. This raises political and ethical questions beyond the confines of technology and artificial intelligence. Moreover, this seemingly never-ending debate on what computers should do provokes the philosophical necessity to once again define the concept of what it is to be ‘human.’. (shrink)

‘The authenticity of the ille ego lines fails on every count’ was the conclusion of an article by Professor R. G. Austin1 on the lines of the Aeneid preceding arma virumque cano. The aim of the following discussion is to suggest that perhaps, after all, Virgil did write the lines. To avoid unnecessary repetition I adhere as closely as possible to Prof. Austin's arrangement of the points to be considered. It is not always the arrangement that I should have chosen (...) myself but I have only had to deviate from it in as far as I have found it necessary to discuss part of the contents of section V ‘Conclusions’ along with section I ‘The Ancient Evidence’. 1t will be understood that only the reader with Prof. Austin's article to hand will find the following fully intelligible. (shrink)

The main interest of this book is to raise the very difficult question of the interrelation between technology and care. Its ambitious aim is to interpret technology and care as ….

Taking up the idea that sanity is a necessary condition for responsibility, Susan Wolf sets forth two criteria for determining whether an actor is sane. I argue that the second criterion is inappropriate for this determination since it invokes some hidden axiological standard. I reexamine a case study that Wolf describes and arrive at a different judgment about the responsibility of the actor. I argue that the foremost criterion for determining whether an actor is sane is functional rather than axiological. (...) The theory of responsibility, rather than the notion of sanity, must do the work of appraising the value of an actors’ behavior, and that must be done in light of the fact that responsible moral agents enjoy varying degrees of sanity. (shrink)

Rufus of Ephesus (fl.c.a.d.100) wrote a large body of works on a variety of medical topics. Generally speaking, the Arabic tradition is particularly important for the reconstruction of much of his œuvre. In the present article, I am going to present four new fragments of Rufus’On Melancholyand a fragment from an otherwise unknown monographOn Preferring Fresh Poppies. These new fragments provide fascinating new insights into Rufus’ approach to recording case histories.

In the contemporary period of history, so deeply contradictory and in many respects conflict ridden, eschatological themes, predictions of universal catastrophe and the ecological or nuclear destruction of mankind, and other motifs of the end of human history have become unprecedentedly widespread and greatly attractive. Despite the huge stores of scientific knowledge accumulated in the past few decades, many people are being drawn more and more into the stream of mystical monstrous visions and are beginning to connect the end of (...) the second millennium with implausible, obsessive apocalyptic presentiments with regard to the world as a whole as well as to our own Russian history. Soothsayers have appeared who have begun to link the phenomena of disintegration and decline and the destruction of political, ethical, and aesthetic criteria being manifested in our country in one way or another directly with the end of Russian history, with the final act of the Russian historical drama. In the sphere of concrete theoretical and philosophical-sociological knowledge, notions of the limit of historical progress, that history has fundamentally, in its essentials, run its course and that from now on the future will bring nothing essentially new, are being put forward and defended. (shrink)